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1. Introduction . In August 1988, RAND Corporation analysts
prepared a preliminary summary of RSAS release 3.5, which dis-
cussed the capabilities and limitations of that release along
with the enhancements that the project leaders believed were
necessary for planning Fiscal Year 1989 development. The summary
also provided an update on user assistance regarding input/output
and critical parameters for the RSAS.
It appears from a user standpoint that release 3.5 is a
considerable improvement over release 3.0, particularly with
regard to the naval models. RSAS users can now conduct a reason-
able naval war at sea even with the known RSAS limitations, but
the main problem now is the integration of the naval war at sea
with the war ashore, to include the testing of various factors
and alternatives to determine the inter-relationship between
these two aspects of warfare.
The basic overall statement regarding naval reguirements is
contained in Part V of the Tritten & Channell Technical Report on
the RSAS installation at the NPS. These reguirements were com-
mented on, and certain aspects were developed further in the
Technical Report by R. N. Channell on problems in modeling
navies. For a discussion of the issue of the unigueness of naval
warfare, see the NPS Technical Report by James Tritten on "Is
Naval Warfare Unigue?".
The increased degree of flexibility as well as complexity in
the naval models of RSAS 3.5 is apparent by the number of naval
and naval related parameters that can be modified. Appendix A is
a RAND listing of selected parameters for the naval and sealift
models that can be modified using the "set" input to the RSAS
Force Window. It is interesting to note that RAND has stated that
these naval parameters are among the most sensitive in the
CAMPAIGN model, and thus must be treated with great care.
This report assumes a certain degree of familiarity on the
part of the reader with the RSAS and naval warfare. First time
readers may wish to explore the above referenced technical
reports for background details.
2. Naval Warfare Priorities . Previous reports on naval warfare
models have not necessarily listed requirements in priority
order. While the priorities are somewhat difficult to state due
to the inter-relationships of the various aspects of naval war-
fare, in response to a request from the RAND project managers to
indicate priorities, the following listing comprises the urgent
RSAS naval warfare priorities for the Naval Postgraduate School:
a. Carrier Battle Group Improvements .
( 1
)
The current method of conducting carrier battle
group (CVBG) air wing strikes against Red surface groups is too
cumbersome, requiring the entry of too much detail for a strategy
level simulation. It is recommended that standard air wing
tactics be entered as the default with minimum variables to
change the intensity of the strike, the proportion of the air
wing involved, and the nature of the target. There should also be
an easy means of launching an attack using up to three carrier
air wings at the same time.
(2) Attacking weapons from both Blue and Red sides
must be distributed against attacked groups to reflect efforts to
concentrate on the primary target, and to use EW and other means
to deflect this targeting. In addition, a procedure must be
developed to indicate that the capability of the carrier to
operate aircraft has been derogated rather than moving from
"fully ready" to "sunk".
( 3
)
The Blue shore air defenses need to be integrated
with the air situation over the ocean in certain areas including
the Norwegian Sea, North Sea, Northeast Atlantic, Mediterranean
Sea, Northern Indian Ocean, Northwest Pacific, and the Bering
Sea. This integration is necessary to attrite Red shore based
aircraft as they transit to attack targets at sea, and to main-
tain continuity on aircraft for both sides.
(4) The CVBG air wing can currently support the war
ashore by contributing sorties to the general air plan being
executed as part of the air-land battle. To permit the study of
the impact of CVBG air operations, the RSAS must be able to
identify the naval generated missions, and the large scale naval
strikes, particularly in AFNORTH and AFSOUTH where this type of
operation should contribute significantly to the battle ashore.
As noted above, the method of generating an air wing attack is
too cumbersome, and needs a default to standard tactics.
b. Nuclear Forces .
(1) For the future study of the impact of naval weapons
on the war ashore, it is essential that attacks by SLCM/TLAM-N 1 s
be integrated into theater nuclear war in the form of a unique
attacking and penetrating unit rather than simply another bomber/
missile to be aggregated into the total. This will permit the
careful study of the contribution these weapons can make to the
land battle.
(2) The RSAS must permit the use of naval strategic
assets (SSBN's and TLAM-N's) for theater nuclear warfare, so that
new concepts can be studied in this area. This will be required
for both Red and Blue forces.
(3) The capability to conduct nuclear warfare outside
the European/NATO areas must be improved to permit study of
options in this regard. Korea is high priority for this improve-
ment to meet current NPS research plans.
c. ASW .
(1) The importance of sea basins to ASW must be re-
flected in at least the high use ocean areas listed under the
carrier battle group requirements above, and in the Arctic Ocean
and the Barents Sea as well. ASW play must take place in these
areas in detail, to include submarines, surface ASW ships, Mari-
time Patrol Aircraft (MPA) , and carrier battle group ASW assets.
(2) Locational data in the key ASW areas must be in
lat/long blocks. See the paragraph on ship locations below for
additional comment.
(3) ASW simulation must include the capability to use
nuclear weapons.
(4) The ASW algorithms appear to run well for "one on
one" , but deteriorate when extrapolated to "many on many"
.
d. Strategic Lift - Sea .
(1) Seaborne strategic lift must be developed to in-
clude the loadout, movement, and offloading of essential war
equipment and supplies, so that this important relationship be-
tween the maritime campaign and the land campaign can be ex-
plored. The RSAS must be able to form and move convoys, and these
convoys must be able to be taken under attack by available sub-
marine and air units, and by mines. The crucial movement of
supplies across the North Atlantic and the further distribution
by sea to the other NATO regions is a key point for study.
(2) Port closures must also have an effect upon the
sealift, and must include air attack, mining, and sabotage.
Repair rates for key ports should be established and aggregated.
(3) The overall lift loss must be folded into the air-
land battle so that loss of essential war equipment and supplies
is a factor. This is another major factor in the relationship of
the war at sea to the war ashore.
e. Ocean Surveillance .
(1) Ocean surveillance is played in a very limited
manner at present, essentially consisting of a SOSUS factor and
an index for "offboard surveillance". It is recognized that
details in this area are classified and sensitive, but overall
gross estimates can be made. In any event, improvement in sur-
veillance monitoring by both sides is needed.
( 2
)
To improve the detection and tracking of naval
units on both sides, a modified ocean surveillance system is
recommended, to include accounting for the more commonly used
sensors for locating units at sea. A useful approach would be to
develop a multi-dimensional matrix to include SOSUS, HFDF, and
space capabilities for each ocean area, and including a script






The RSAS must be able to load out marine units in
their typical embarked formations, using aggregate numbers of
ships to lift the units. The amphibious group must be capable of
conducting transits, taking attacks and losses, landing marines
unopposed, or opposed with appropriate attrition, and then adding
the marines to the ground battle as appropriate. Similar capa-
bilities are required for the Red naval infantry and lift units.
(2) Marine air support must be included in the amphib-
ious warfare operations noted above.
g. Mine Warfare .
Improvements have been made; however, additional pro-
cedures are required to permit better play. Minelaying force
availability must be considered as a factor in limiting the
number of mines sown, and minesweeping forces must be simulated
so that a reasonable number of mines is destroyed.
h. Logistics .
It is recommended that a start be made regarding the
logistics support of naval forces at sea. Initially, factors need
to be developed for underway replenishment of at least fuel,
ammunition, missiles, and bombs. This will require the establish-
ment and protection of underway replenishment groups, which could
run in the background, but must provide a limit on naval opera-
tions.
3. Analytic War Plans . Additional Analytic War Plans (AWP's) are
required to depict such standard sea strategies as the "swing",
and the "maritime", and to provide the flexibility to test other
differing strategies. The naval plans should be part of the
CINCLANT and CINCPAC AWP's, and there should be plans for SACLANT
to conduct naval operations, and to support SACEUR. In this
regard, the Red side naval AWP's need to be developed to reflect
Soviet doctrines of "bastion", lines of surveillance and attack,
tattletales and reconnaissance, and the coordinated strike. Since
many of these plans cross Soviet theater (TVD) boundaries, these
plans should be developed under the appropriate commander.
The command structure of the U.S. forces should be as close
to the real world as possible. Several of the unified and speci-
fied commands are missing from the RSAS structure. If these
commands are included as part of JCS for the RSAS evolution, this
should be clearly explained. Command and control of forces is a
major issue for both sides, and should be simulated as realistic-
ally as possible.
4. Combat Operations in Other Theaters . As noted above, NPS has
an urgent requirement for the updating and improvement of warfare
in the Korean area, particularly with regard to potential nuclear
warfare and the relationship of the war at sea to the war ashore.
This will require the integration of tactical air, SLCM's, TLAM-
N's, and SSBN's so that new concepts can be examined. NPS also
requires models for Cuba and Iceland to ensure that a proper
analysis of the relationship of the war in Europe and the war at
sea can be accomplished. Cuba and Iceland are important in this
regard, particularly for coordination with the naval campaign.
5. Ship Locations . This problem must be addressed. The use of
large ocean areas in the RSAS is not acceptable to naval
officers, and is undermining attempts to gain acceptance of the
RSAS. It is recommended that lat/long blocks of some sort be
developed for the ocean areas listed under the carrier battle
group and ASW requirements above, and that the RSAS be redesigned
to use these blocks for sea warfare. The new "rolling globe"
presentation for naval units is a superb graphic, but appears to
be only partly integrated with CAMPAIGN model. Battle groups
moved by "order", for example, appear to change their location on
the rolling globe. However, during the course of CAMPAIGN execu-
tion, battle group moves and losses do not seem to be reflected
on the rolling globe.
6. Database . It is imperative that the database be kept reason-
ably current. The 1985 default database is rapidly aging. The
plan to modify the database with updated material for specific
requirements will likely result in a confused and difficult RSAS
database. Users will lose confidence in the RSAS if the database
is allowed to become out of date, and will turn elsewhere for
their gaming and simulation system.
7. Warfare at Sea and the War Ashore . It is recognized that the
RSAS is being called upon to do many things, and it is necessary
to keep the system running at high speed, but the naval improve-
ments listed above are essential if the RSAS is to become useful
to naval analysts and players. Above all, NPS needs sufficient
RSAS capability to be able to demonstrate the relationship of
warfare at sea to the war ashore. NPS is moving into studies
requiring increased use of the RSAS. The requirements for naval
and naval related models need to be assigned higher priority to
10
ensure that they will be available. The RSAS is the only simula-
tion in operation that has a reasonable capability of integrating
the war at sea with the war ashore. Improved naval models are




SELECTED NAVAL AND SEALIFT PARAMETERS























































aaw mm sea group type
aaw max sea group type
entry_min sea group type
entry_max sea group type
small_attack sea group type
long_attr sea group type
short attr sea group type
aaw msl lr vessel vessel
aaw msl sr vessel vessel
aaw_msl_lr class class
aaw msl sr class class
Multiplier of national naval
capability.
Sinks the ship referenced.
Sets ship survival level.
Basic ASW attrition rate.
Relative ASW losses to defending
submarines that are in transit,
SSBN's on-station, and others.
Relative ASW losses to attacking
subs, in transit, and others.
Scales multi-platform ASW rela-
tive to 1-on-l engagements.
ASW capability of this class.
ASW vulnerability of this class.
Multipliers of ASW effectiveness
and vulnerability during fast
transit.
Effect of ice on ASW by season.
ASW intensity in a choke.
Relative capability and vulner-
ability of diesel subs in a
choke point.
Effect of area sensor on ASW
capability.
Bounds for imposing an entry
price for AAW defenses.
Bounds on the entry price for
AAW defenses.
Attack size below which entry-min
is used.
Percent of engaged attackers lost
to long & short range defenses.
Long-range AAW weapon inventory.
Short-range AAW weapon inventory.
Initial load of long-range AAW
weapons
.
Initial load of short-range AAW
weapons




























offboard-sen naval sea region
hits vessel group
Mine Warfare :
mine-lay choke choke pnts
mine-effect naval sea region
mcm-deploy choke choke pnts







green-delay choke choke pnts
blue-delay choke choke pnts
red-delay choke choke pnts
damage choke choke pnts
Probability that US EW deflects
attacking missile from target.
Probability that deflected weapon
will reacquire some target.
National ECM effectiveness (US=1),
Multiplier AAW supplies and
saturation.
Saturation levels for long-range
and short-range AAW by class.
Hits required to sink this class.
Fraction of AAW/ASW capability
lost by taking hits.
Probability attacker can focus
attack on key ships, given
intelligence.
Duration of advantage from
reconnaissance of battle group.
Scripts presence of surveillance.
Scripts hits on a battle group.
Lays more mines in choke point.
Hits achieved by mines/km of
track width.
Sets quantity of MCM assets in
choke point.
Sq kms cleared by one MCM asset
per day.
Determines whether forces route
through the Suez and Panama
Canals.
Imposes delay in crossing choke



















be same as "Movement" above):
choke Scripts damage to Suez, Panama, Bosporus,
choke Scripts political delays or closures to
choke blue, red or green ships at Suez,
choke Panama, Bosporus.
choke Scripts employment of mines and mine counter-
choke measures at maritime choke points,
force Cargo space utilization in ship slack space,
govt Set national guidance concerning the use
govt of Suez and Panama canals for use by the
govt sealift and naval combatant routine
govt module
.
mobility Reclassify sealift between two classes of
mobility ships.
mobility Script damage to sealift.
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